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INTRODUCTION

The United States confines hundreds of thousands of children each year to cells
approximately the size of an apartment bathroom. The children live in these cells,
staring at concrete walls, for twenty-three hours per day, free for only one hour of
recreation.' The Department of Justice recently estimated that as many as 17,000
juveniles live in isolation cells nationwide. 2 One in five juvenile jails employ
punitive isolation to punish children for a wide range of infractions. Isolation is an
unnecessarily harsh punishment technique that is overused against children
throughout the United States. Kentucky joins ten states that authorize punitive
juvenile solitary confinement for an indefinite period of time. 4
Criticism against the use of punitive solitary confinement has steadily risen in
recent years. President Obamas the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry,' the United Nations,', Kentucky Senator Rand Paul,' and the United
States Department of Justice,' among others, have spoken out against punitive
juvenile solitary confinement-advocating for its elimination because the harm
greatly outweighs the benefits. States surrounding Kentucky, including Illinois,"o

I Abby Taskier, DC's Youth Face SoBtary Confinement in DistrictJails and Federal Prisons,
SOLITARY WATCH (Dec. 19, 2013), http://solitarywatch.com/2013/12/19/dcs-youth-face-solitaryconfinement-district-jails-federal-prisons/.
Timothy Williams, Locked in Solitary at 14: Adult Jails IsolateJuveniles Despite Risk, N.Y.
TiMES (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/us/citing-safety-adult-jails-putjuveniles-in-solitary-despite-risks.html?_r=1.
Dana Liebelson, This Is What Happens When We Lock Children in Solitary Confinement,
MOTHER JONES (JanlFeb. 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/01/juveniles-kidssolitary-confinement-ohio-new-york.
4 Dana Liebelson, L 10 States, Children Can Be Punished with Indefnite Solitary Confinement,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2015, 1:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/children-solitaryconfinementus_5637991fe4b00aa54a4ee011.
s Editorial, President Obama Takes on the Prison Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/opinion/president-obama-takes-on-the-prison-crisis.htm
(discussing solitary confinement generally).
6
juvenile Justice Reform Comm., Soliary Confinement ofJuvenile Ofenders, AM. ACAD. CHILD
2012),
(Apr.
PSYCHIATRY
ADOLESCENT
&
https://www.aacap.org/aacap/PolicyStatements/2012/SolitaryConfinement-of JuvenileOffenders.as
px. 7
Id.

' Press Release, U.S. Senator Cory Booker, Booker Introduces Legis. Banning Juv. Solitary
Confinement (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press-release8cid=293; Liebelson, supra
note 3.
9 Combatting Excessive Use ofjuvenile Solitary Confinement, U.S. DEPT JUST. (May 13, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/video/combating-excessive-use-juvenile-solitary-confinementpage=1.
1o RJ v. Jones, AM. C.L. UNION ILL., http://www.aclu-il.org/r-j-v-bishop22/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2016).
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West Virginia,"n and Ohio,' 2 have eliminated using isolation as a punishment
against youth. Kentucky should join these states, as solitary confinement directly
contradicts the goals of Senate Bill 200, the Juvenile Justice Reform Bill.
Kentucky recently enacted Senate Bill 200, commonly referred to as the
Juvenile Justice Reform Bill, which raises the standard for committing children to
juvenile facilities. However, Kentucky continues to utilize indefinite punitive
solitary confinement, a practice contrary to Senate Bill 200's stated goal of reducing
the number of incarcerated children.14 Isolated children are more likely to reoffend
because the brain damage resulting from isolation permanently changes their
impulse control and ability to make mature decisions.15 As such, Kentucky should
join the growing consensus asserting that juvenile punitive solitary confinement
violates the constitutional rights of youth in detention and eliminate this damaging
practice.
Part I of this Note begins with an explanation of the practices commonly
employed by states that authorize solitary confinement, an examination of the
changing landscape of punitive solitary confinement across America, and a
description of Kentucky's practices. Part II discusses the scientific effects of
isolation on children's brains, extrapolated from studies conducted on adults and
juvenile animals in solitary confinement. Part III discusses how indefinite punitive
solitary confinement violates constitutional protections and examines how the
federal government and other states have used these arguments to eradicate its use.
Part IV argues that juvenile solitary confinement contributes to recidivism and
directly contradicts the goals of Senate Bill 200. Part V offers solutions and
alternatives, including abolishing the practice completely.
I. THE USE OF PUNITIVE JUVENILE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN
KENTUCKY AND ACROSS THE UNITED STATES

'

Many juvenile facilities today place children in punitive and non-punitive
solitary confinement under the guise of parenspatriae- the belief that the state can
act as a surrogate parent, taking youth into custody and rehabilitating them.
Although juvenile solitary confinement is a prevalent practice, it goes by many

11
Associated Press, W Va. Ends Solitary Confinement for Juveniles, TIMES WEST VIRGINIAN
(Apr.
26,
2012),
http://www.timeswv.com/news/w-va-ends-solitary-confinement-forjuveniles/article_79dclc7e-3279-5e97-adef-fc45c9c2deaa.html.
12
Justice Department Settles Lawsuit Against State of Ohio to End Unlawful Seclusion of Youth
in
Juvenile
Correctional Facilities, U.S.
DEPT
JUST.
(May
21,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settles-lawsuit-against-state-ohio-end-unlawfulseclusion-youth-juvenile [hereinafter Lawsuit to EndJuvenile Seclusion in Ohio].
13 Kentucky's 2014JuvenileJustice Reform, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 1, 7-8 (July 2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2014/07/psppkyjuvenilejusticereformbriefjuly2Ol4.pdf.
"Id. at 1.
1s Liebelson, supra note 3.
16 Liebelson, supra note 3.
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names: the shu, the box, 23-1, and more.1 7 This makes accountability difficult for
advocates. Additionally, there is no public reporting mechanism that requires the
state to publish the number of isolated juveniles. Despite these difficulties, many
states, the federal government, and many agencies have come to understand the
harmful effects of juvenile solitary confinement and have banned or spoken against
the practice.
Facilities use solitary confinement for punitive and non-punitive reasons.
Punitive confinement places a youth in solitary as a sanction for a specified or
unspecified amount of time.'" Non-punitive confinement isolates youth because
they pose a threat to themselves, others, or the security of the facility, and
authorizes release when they no longer pose a risk." However, the line between
punitive and non-punitive often blurs as juvenile facility staff loosely interpret the
20
requirements, leading to the use of punitive-like solitary confinement. Kentucky
explicitly authorizes non-punitive confinement2and remains one of ten states in
the country that authorizes indefinite punitive solitary confinement. 'Kentucky
continues to authorize punitive and non-punitive solitary confinement
indefinitely.

A. The Hole: Rationale, Terms, Duration, andFrequency ofSolitaryConfinement
Prisons have used solitary confinement since the 1800s, when administrators
believed placing a person in solitude would cause them to repent and change their
criminal behavior. 24 The practice remained relatively uncommon until twenty years
ago. At that time, the number of incarcerated juveniles rose after criminal justice
systems adopted stricter sanctions for youth in response to the crack epidemic and
the fears of violent, youthful "super-predators." 2 5 Correctional facilities justified
these measures through the parens patriae doctrine, where the "state serves as a
26
surrogate parent, educating and rehabilitating wayward kids." Kentucky adopted a
similar rationale for its juvenile justice system: to "provide services for the

17

Infra note 32 and accompanying text.
s Kraner et al., supra note 28, at 2, 10.
Id. at 6.

20

Id.

21
2

DJJ 323, supra note 23.
Liebelson, supra note 4.

2JUSTICE AND PUB. SAFETY CABINET DEPT OFJUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY AND PROCEDURES,
POLICY NO. Dfl 323 (2016), http://djj.ky.gov/300%20Policy%2OManual/DJJ%20323%20Isolation.pdf
[hereinafter DJJ 323].
24 Liebelson, supra note 3.
2. Id.
26

Id
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rehabilitation of probated and committed youth." 27 Although juvenile solitary
confinement eventually became an institutional, common practice, many
jurisdictions have recently banned solitary confinement, while others question their
commitment. 28 Kentucky should follow this trend and recognize that placing
juveniles in solitary confinement indefinitely does not serve the goals of
rehabilitation or education.
Institutions and youth use many terms to describe solitary confinement, which
create barriers to advocates attempting to track its prevalence and duration. 29
Solitary confinement is generally understood to be "the placement of an
incarcerated individual in a locked room or cell with minimal or no contact with
people other than staff of the correctional facility.""o Juvenile facilities describe the
practice as "room restriction, segregation, isolation, room lock, lockdown, seclusion,
behavior modification unit, and others." 3" Slang terms among youth include
"lockup, 23 and 1, dark room."3 2 These seemingly innocuous terms create barriers
for advocates trying to track the number of juveniles in isolation and create systems
of accountability.
The lack of published statistics creates another barrier for advocates trying to
determine the prevalence of solitary confinement. 3 Few studies exist about the use
of juvenile solitary confinement in America. The Department of Justice ("DOJ")
conducted one study in 2011, which determined that 61,423 minors lived in
27

300.1

JUSTICE CABINET DEP'T

(2016),

JUVENILE

JUSTICE POLICY AND PROCEDURES, POLICY No. DJ

http://djj.ky.gov/300%2OPolicy%2OManual/DJJ%20300-

1%2OPrograms%20and%20Services.pdf [hereinafter Dfl 300.1].
21 See Natalie J. Kraner et al., 51 -JurisdictionalSurvey offuvenile SolitaryConfinement Rules in
Juvenile Justice Systems, LOWENSTEIN
CTR. FOR PUB. INT. 1, 2 (October 2015),
http://wwwJowensteinprobono.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Pro%20Bono/51Jurisdiction%2OSurvey%20of%620Juvenile%2OSolitary%2OConfinement%2ORules.pdf.
29 Rachel Barth, US. PrisonsAre Trying to Rebrand Soltary Confinement, Bus. INSIDER (Apr.
11, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://mobile.businessinsider.com/prisons-want-to-rebrand-solitary-confinement2014-4 (discussing how the juvenile justice system has rebranded solitary confinement, now calling it
other various terms).
30Juvenile Justice Reform Comm., supra note 6.
31 See, e.g, Kraner, supra note 28, at 10; see also Barth, supra note 29 (discussing the rebranding of
solitary confinement). A further illustration: Kentucky's Department of Corrections, which regulates the
adult prison system in the state, refers to solitary confinement as "administrative segregation,"
"disciplinary segregation," and "protective custody." KY. CORR. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, SPECIAL
MGMT.
INMATES,
POLICY
NO.
10.2,
1
(2015),
http://corrections.ky.gov/corimunityinfo/Policies%20and%20Procedures/Documents/CH10/CPP%6201
0-2%20Effect%207-31-15.pdf [hereinafter SPECIAL MGMT. INMATES, POLICY NO. 10.2].
32 Barth, supra note 29; see also Liebelson, supra note 3 (referring to solitary confinement as the
"hole"); Am. Civil Liberties Union & Human Rights Watch, Growing Up Locked Down: Youth in
Solitary Confinement in Jails and Prisons Across the United States, AM. C.L. UNION 1, 131 (Oct.
2012), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field-document/uslOl2webwcover.pdf
(referring to
solitary confinement as SHU).
33
Alone & Afaid: Children Heldin Sobtary Confinementand Isolation inJuvenile Detention and
Correctional
Facilties,
AM.
C.L.
UNION
1,
7
(June
2014),
https://www.adu.org/files/assets/Alone%20and%20Afraid%20COMPLETE%2OFINAL.pdf
[hereinafter Alone &AbiidJ.

c,17
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juvenile facilities across the United States. One in five of those facilities used
isolation as a punitive measure. ' Recently, the DOJ estimated the number of
juveniles in solitary confinement at 17,000.3s This number has certainly changed as
more states restrict or eliminate the use of solitary confinement. The Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention conducted an anonymous survey of
7,073 children in residential placements ("SYRP") and asked them to describe their
experiences in juvenile facilities that ranged from community placement to
correctional facilities." Of the juveniles surveyed, 35% reported being isolated in
their rooms or in solitary confinement.3 1 Over half of the juveniles surveyed
reported being isolated longer than twenty-four hours and 87% reported being
isolated over two hours.3 ' Although best practice guidelines recommend that
juveniles see a counselor after being confined for over two hours, 52% of those
locked in solitary confinement did not speak to a counselor.3" It is clear the
reported number of juveniles in solitary confinement is, at best, an educated guess.
There are no published statistics about the number of juveniles held in solitary
confinement in Kentucky.
Many juveniles are housed in solitary confinement within adult facilities as a
protective measure while awaiting adjudication, or after sentencing when charged
as an adult." The rate of suicide among these youth is approximately double that of
adults held in solitary confinement.41 In addition, many transgender youth are held

Liebelson, supra note 3.
supra note 2.
Andrea J. Sedlak & Karla S. McPherson, Conditions of Confinement: Findingsfrom the Survey
of Youth in Residentd Placement, U.S.
DEPT JUSTICE 1, 1-2 (May 2010),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/227729.pdf.
37
Id. at 9.
3'

3
s Williams,
36

' Am. Civil Liberties Union & Human Rights Watch, supra note 32, at 48. The ACLU and
Human Rights Watch reports that 95,000 juveniles were held in adult prisons and jails in 2011. Id. at 2.
The Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) mandktes that youth under the age of 18 must be separated
by sight and sound from adult inmates and no child may be "placed in a housing unit in which the
youthful inmate will have sight, sound, or physical contact with any adult inmate through use of a
shared dayroom or other common space, shower area, or sleeping quarters." National Standards To
Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 37106, 37130 (June 20, 2012) (codified at
28 C.F.R. pt. 115). This leads many prisons to isolate youth from adult inmates by using solitary
confinement despite PREA's admonition against the practice. Am. Civil Liberties Union & Human
Rights Watch, supranote 32, at 48.
41 See Reassessing Solitary Confnrement II. The Human Rights, Escal, and Pubbc Safety
Consequences:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rtghts and Human Rtghts of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) (statement of Carmen E. Daugherty, Policy
Justice),
Youth
for
Campaign
Director,
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documentsafestimonies/senate%20judiciary%20testimony%20
2014.pdf (explaining that from 2000 to 2007, the "suicide rate of youth in jails was 63.0 per 100,000
under-18 inmates, as compared to 42.1 per 100,000 inmates overall, and 31 per 100,000 inmates aged
18-24.").
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in solitary confinement as a protective measure. 42 Because of these high statistics,
the DOJ calls for housing youth who must be held in adult facilities in dedicated
units, or reforming sentencing practices to allow youth to remain in juvenile
facilities.43 While these topics certainly deserve attention, they are beyond the scope
of this paper.
B. A DwindlingNumber: The Use ofPunitiveJuvenile Sohtary
ConfinementAcross the United States
The conversation surrounding juvenile solitary confinement has quickly
changed as federal, state, and international governments recognize the detriments
of isolating children. Throughout the past two years, the number of states that ban
punitive solitary confinement has increased." Initially, the federal government
recognized the inherently different needs of incarcerated children when it passed
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act ("JJDPA"), which created
financial incentives for states to provide effective youth rehabilitation and
treatment. 45 On August 5, 2015, Senators Rand Paul, Cory Booker, Dick Durbin,
and Mike Lee introduced the Maintaining dignity and Eliminating unnecessary
Restrictive Confinements of Juveniles Act of 2015 ("MERCY Act") to ban federal
juvenile solitary confinement except "as a temporary response to a behavioral issue
that poses serious and immediate risk to any individual."4 Before Congress voted
on the Act, President Obama issued a series of orders banning juvenile solitary
confinement in federal prisons, calling the practice "an affront to our common
humanity." 47 The U.S. Attorney General's National Task Force on Children
Exposed to Violence echoed President Obama's concern: "Nowhere is the
damaging impact of incarceration on vulnerable children more obvious than when

42

Am. Civil Liberties Union & Human Rights Watch, supra note 32, at 56; see also SPECIAL
MGMT. INMATES, POLICY NO. 10.2, supra note 31, at 1 (showing that the Kentucky Department of
Corrections policy manual provides that inmates may be placed in protective custody if they are "in
danger of being harmed by any other inmate or who, for various reasons other than a rule violation, [are]
unable to adjust to living in the general inmate population.").
4 National Standards To Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 37106, 37130
(June 20, 2012) (codified at 28 C.F.R pt. 115).
" Compare Catherine Weiss et al., 51-JurisdictionalSurvey offuvenile Soltary Confinement Rules
in Juvenile Justice Systems, LOWENSTEIN CTR. FOR PUB. INT. 1 (August 2013),
https://www.lowenstein.com/files/upload/SolitaryConfinementSurvey.pdf (showing that nineteen states
have banned lengthy punitive solitary confinement), with Kraner et al., supra note 28, at 2 (showing that
twenty-one states have banned punitive solitary confinement).
45 HistOy of the JJDPA, COALITION FOR JUV. JUST., http://www.juvjustice.org/federalpolicy/juvenile-justice-and-delinquency-prevention-act (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
*Press Release, U.S. Senator Cory Booker, supra note 8.
47
Barack Obama, Opinion, Barack Obama: Why We Must Rethink Soltary Confinement, WASH.
POST (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-mustrethink-solitary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-lle5-89650607ee265ce-story.htmltid=a i.
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it involves solitary confinement." 4 8 These changes only apply to children in federal
prisons,. however, and do not apply to children in facilities managed by the
Kentucky Department ofJuvenile Justice.
Not only has national awareness with regard to juvenile solitary confinement in
the United States risen, the international community has taken notice. The United
Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty banned
solitary confinement in 1990, "[a]ll disciplinary measures constituting cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment shall be strictly prohibited, including corporal
punishment, placement in a dark cell, closed or solitary confinement or any other
punishment that may compromise the physical or mental health of the juvenile
concerned."4 9

C. Threat to OrderlyManagement:The Use ofPunitive
Juvenile Solitary Confinement in Kentucky
The Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ") regulates the discipline of
children in its care and explicitly authorizes potentially indefinite punitive solitary
confinement.so The DJJ operates long term residential youth development centers
("YDCs") for children committed to state custody and short term juvenile
detention centers for youth awaiting adjudication.s" Kentucky authorizes six types
of solitary confinement for major rule violations in YDCs: isolation, room
confinement, room restriction, intensive room restriction, intensive room
supervision, and time out. 52 Juvenile detention centers utilize isolation, room
restriction, and time out.13 All of these involve placing a child in a room or a space,
alone, for a period of time. However, only isolation involves placing a child alone
54
for a potentially indefinite period of time.

48 ROBERT L. LISTENBEE, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF THE ArORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL

TASK

FORCE

ON

CHILDREN

EXPOSED

TO

VIOLENCE

178

(2012),

http://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf.
49 uvenile Justice Reform Comm., supra note 6.
50 DJJ 323, supra note 23.
st Facihties, DEPT OF JUV. JUST., http://d.ky.gov/Faciities/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 3,
2016). In juvenile courts, adjudication refers to a finding of guilt by a judge, similar to an adult
conviction. Commonly Used Terms, JUv. L. CTR., http*//jlc.org/news-room/media-resources/glossary
(last visited Aug. 7, 2016).
52
JUSTICE AND PUB. SAFETY CABINET DEPT OFJUVENILEJUSTICE POLICY AND PROCEDURES,
(2016),
http-//djj.ky.gov/300%2OPolicy%2OManual/DJJ%20318DJJ 318.1
POLICY NO.
1%2OGraduated%20Responses%20Sancttions%20and%20Incentives.pdf [hereinafter DJJ 318.1].
53

JUSTICE CABINET DEP'T OFJUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY AND PROCEDURES, POLICY No. DJJ

717 (2006), http://d.ky.gov/700%2OPolicy%2OManual/717%20Discipline%20021506.pdf.
s Intensive room supervision, like isolation, involves placing a youth alone in an isolation room for
up to twenty-four hours, except the door remains open and under constant staff supervision. Id.
Facilities use this when a youth "is showing or expressing a behavior that is a safety or security threat to
the program; . . [a]s a less restrictive attempt to avoid a locked isolation placement; or. . as a step-down
from an isolation placement." Id. Room restriction removes child from the general population for

t60
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All YDCs may isolate "[y]outh who threaten the safety, security, and orderly
management of the facility [by separating them] from the general population and
[placing them] in special isolation units to allow for individualized intervention.""s
The range of offenses that could land a child in isolation vary. These include:
assault, attempted assault, sexual assault, attempted sexual assault, escape,
attempted escape, absent without leave ("AWOL"), attempted AWOL, riot,
plotting a riot, dangerous contraband, extensive property damage, and chronic
program disruption.s" While many of these offenses seem to be justified by their
threat to the safety of the staff or other youth, other offenses have the potential for
ambiguity and overuse: plotting a riot, dangerous contraband, and chronic program
disruption are not defined in Kentucky's Juvenile Justice Policy and Procedure
Manual ("Policy Manual"). These could easily be used to isolate youth for speaking
out of turn, holding a pencil outside of class, or giggling in class.
The Policy Manual authorizes indefinite isolation. Although the Policy Manual
states "youth shall not be isolated longer than necessary,"s" the Superintendent can
authorize isolation beyond four hours, and the Director of Medical Services or the
Chief of Mental Health Services can authorize isolation over the stated five-day
maximum. s Although, once a child is placed in locked-door isolation, a staff
member must create a plan for release and conduct a review every four hours. This
is done to determine if the child is following the plan.59 An uninvolved staff
member must also conduct an isolation placement review every twenty-four hours.
The Superintendent, Treatment Director, Facility Nurse, and Psychologist should
also visit the child every day, according to the Policy Manual.'
Although "[ilsolation shall not be used as a suicide precaution," 1 suicidal
children can be placed in or remain in isolation. If a child becomes suicidal after
being placed in isolation and presents an immediate assault risk to staff or other
youth, the staff can authorize the youth to remain in isolation.62 The staff must
reevaluate the youth's mental status if the youth becomes suicidal, assaultive, or
homicidal again.' If a youth becomes suicidal outside of isolation, staff can place
the youth in isolation if he or she "present[s] an immediate assault risk to staff or

behavior management and to allow them to "process their behavior." Id. Children on room restriction
must remain within sight and sound and can remain the way up to twelve hours. Id. Room confinement
involves placing a child housed at a level five facility in a separate room with the door dosed to avoid a
placement in isolation. Id. Room confinement can occur up to four hours once each twenty-four-hour
period. Id. Time out temporarily removes the child; staff can initiate a time out and time out can last up
to one hour. Id.
ss DJJ 323, supra note 23.
56

57
5

Id.
_d

Id.

59Id
60 Id
61Id
62
63

Id
Id.
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other youth" and if other less restrictive interventions have failed or are
4
inappropriate. 6
The Policy Manual provides youth accused of major rule violations and subject
to isolation, room confinement, intensive room supervision, etc., in YDCs and
detention centers with few guaranteed rights. Accused youth have the right to an
investigation within twenty-four hours of the accusation, notice in the form of a
penalty slip, and a hearing before the treatment team where the child can make a
statement, call witnesses (if the witnesses' behavior permits), and have staff
representation (if the staff is on duty in juvenile detention centers) within seven
business days, although this time can be extended.s Youth have a right to attend
"unless [their] behavior justifies exclusion" or the youth waives attendance in
writing. 6 Although the Policy Manual states that isolation may last up to five days
per offense, the treatment team is required to meet within seven business days, so a
child could potentially remain in isolation or any other form of solitary
confinement for more than five days. 7
If the youth is found guilty, the treatment team imposes additional sanctions,
which can include isolation. Interestingly, the Policy Manual warns that sanctions
shall not "include the use of restraints or isolation," but it allows "impos[ing]
additional measures on a youth for the behavior requiring isolation or restraint.""
So, theoretically, the hearing could occur with a youth representing themselves
without legal knowledge or witnesses, without the youth present whatsoever, or
after an indefinite amount of time. There are no policies guaranteeing the youth
counsel, the right to attend, or a hearing within a definite period of time.
The Policy Manual does not require anyone to notify a court, attorney, or the
child's parents of placement in solitary confinement or these hearings. Therefore,
there are no systems of accountability outside of the DJJ System to guarantee these
hearings occur, or that youth receive due process within the hearing. The
Confining Facility is required to make a note in the child's hard and electronic file,
which is reviewed by the Superintendent.6 9 Increasing reporting requirements will
provide accountability and protect the child's due process rights by ensuring a party
outside of the Confining Facility is aware of the confinement or sanctions imposed.

4*Id.

JUSTICE CABINET DEP'r OFJUVENJLE JUSTICE POLICY AND PROCEDURES, POLICY No. Dfl
http://djj.ky.gov/300%2OPolicy%2OManuaVDJJ%20318(2016),
318.2
2%20%2ODisciplinary%20Review.pdf [hereinafter DJJ 318.2].
-

66
Id.
67
68

Id

DJJ 318.1, supra note 52.
supra note 23.

69 DJJ 323,
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II. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT CREATES LONG-LASTING, DAMAGING
EFFECTS AND PARTICULARLY HARMS CHILDREN BECAUSE
OF THEIR STATUS AS DEVELOPING INDIVIDUALS

Since its inception, researchers have found that solitary confinement causes
extreme and long-lasting effects, even finding indefinite solitary confinement too
harsh of a punishment."o Current research indicates that isolation can cause its own
syndrome: causing symptoms such as hallucinations, hyper-sensitivity, and
perceptual distortions that only those in isolation experience. " Solitary
confinement causes irreparable harm to the children who are forced to endure it.
The effects suffered by adults are more pronounced in children because children's
brains are still developing. 72 The chemistry of the brain changes as solitary
confinement causes the release of cortisol and the development of synapses and the
way the brain grows may be altered. This prevents children from growing out of
impulsive behaviors or developing coping skills, which increases rates of
recidivism.74 Kentucky should recognize these effects as what they are: antithetical
to the goals of the juvenile justice system and Senate Bill 200.
A. SigniflcantPsychologicalPain:Effects ofSolitary Confinement on Adults
First called the "Philadelphia System," the American penal system introduced
prolonged incarceration and solitary confinement in the early nineteenth century.75
Although America eventually abandoned the system of universal, automatic, and
prolonged solitary confinement, the effects were obvious: prisoners suffered from
delirium, confusion, paranoia, hallucinations, intense agitation, self-directed
violence, exacerbation of underlying mental illnesses, and inflicted "significant
psychological pain." It "impaired [the prisoners] capacity to adapt successfully to
the broader prison environment."7 In the case of In re Medley, the Supreme Court
held that a sentence of indefinite solitary confinement was too extreme, stating:
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short
confimement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was
next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently
insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the
ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did
' See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
n Stuart Grassian, PsychiatricEffects ofSoltary Confinement, 22 WASH. UJ.L. &POL'Y, 2006 at
332.
72 Sec infra note 80 and accompanying text (describing effects sustained by adults); Liebelson, supra
note 3 (describing the fact that brains continue to develop into adulthood).
" Liebelson, supranote 3.
74
d.
s Grassian, supra note 71 at 325, 328.
76 Id. at 328-29.
n Id. at 329.
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not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent
service to the community.7 8
Stuart Grassian, a psychiatrist studying the solitary confinement of women in
Lexington, Kentucky, described similar symptoms: "[I]ndividuals will soon become
incapable of maintaining an adequate state of alertness and attention to the
environment. Indeed, even a few days of solitary confinement will predictably shift
the electroencephalogram (EEG) pattern toward an abnormal pattern characteristic
of stupor and delirium."79 He describes symptoms such as hyper-responsivity to
external stimuli (such as noise, sound, and light); perceptual distortions, illusions,
and hallucinations; panic attacks; difficulty with thinking, concentration, and
memory; obsessions, typically rage or revenge (one prisoner obsessed over killing
the guards); overt paranoia; and problems with impulse control. 0 Symptoms such
as loss of perceptual constancy (which is when the prisoner experiences objects
became larger and smaller, noises became softer and louder), severe hallucinations,
and hypersensitivity to stimuli are very rare but occurred often after a person had
been confined in isolation for a period of time."
Although the women Grassian studied were highly educated and had no history
of mental illness, they experienced high rates of perceptual disturbances, anxiety,
and panic attacks.82 They also experienced difficulty concentrating, thinking, and
remembering.' One woman described her inability to write or concentrate past
three hours of waking up, stating that she remained "in a fog" and unable to think
dearly for the remainder of the day.84
The long-term effects of solitary confinement include post-traumatic stress
disorder and personality changes, such as intolerance to social interaction, feeling
withdrawn, and lasting fear.85 These effects last for several years, leaving the person
"dramatically different from their functioning prior to solitary confinement."
Grassian suggests that solitary confinement creates its own syndrome because these
symptoms are so rare on their own but occur together once a person has been
placed in solitary confinement." They affect people with no history of mental
illness." These effects also translate to childrenis

In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
9 Grassian, supra note 71, at 327, 330-31, 352.
0 Id. at 335-36.
81 Id. at 337; see also Alone &Afraid, supra note 33, at 4.
" Grassian, supra note 71, at 352-53.
3 Id. at 353.
Jld. at 353.
8 Id
6 Id. at 354.
7 Id. at 333, 335-38.
1Id. at 352-53.
9 Alone &Aflaid, supra note 33 at 4-5.
7
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B. Losing Motivation:Effects ofSoltary Confinement on Children

'

While research on the effects of solitary confinement on developing juvenile
brains is rare, research does indicate that prolonged isolation has direct and lasting
effects. Children experience time differently, so a day for a child feels longer than a
day for an adult." They also have an increased need for social stimulation." These
perceptual differences make it more difficult for children to withstand solitary
confinement and cause the effects to be longer lasting.92 The prefrontal cortex, the
section of the brain that impacts self-control, working memory, and decisionmaking, continues to develop through adulthood, actively changing as teenagers
develop." Research on adolescent marmosets indicates that isolation increases the
stress hormone cortisol and decreases the production of neurons in the
hippocampus. 94 In one research study, the marmosets stopped cleaning themselves
and became anxious while isolated. 9s David Chura, a teacher who spent a decade
teaching isolated youth in New York, watched his students experience similar
effects." They began to experience many of the same symptoms: "The motivation
for doing anything was lost."" Researchers believe the results from the studies
involving animals can be directly extrapolated and applied to human teenagers:
"[T]he results would suggest that kids already prone to breaking rules will become
even morelikely to act out" because a whole different network develops.9 s This, in
turn, leads to symptoms of mental illness and drug addiction, increasing the risk of
recidivism."
The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry recognizes the
unique impact solitary confinement has on children as their brains continue to
form: "The potential psychiatric consequences of prolonged solitary confinement
are well recognized and include depression, anxiety and psychosis. Due to their
developmental vulnerability, juvenile offenders are at particular risk of such adverse
reactions."o These symptoms sound quite similar to the syndrome symptoms
described by Dr. Grassian in adults.' 0
These adverse reactions often lead to suicide, as the children are unable to cope
and their perception of time lengthens.' 02 The rate of suicide among children
90
Alone & Afraid, supra note 33, at 5.
91
Id
Id. at 4-5.
93
Laura Dimon, How Soltary Confinement Hurts the Teenage Brain, ATLATmC (June 30, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/how-solitary-confinement-hurts-the-teenagebrain/373002/.
94 Liebelson, supra note 3.
95

Id.

97

1d
Id.
99
Id.
" Juvenile Justice Reform Comm., supra note 6 (footnotes omitted).
101 Grassian, supra note 71, at 335-37.
Alone andAbraid, supra note 33, at 5.

Id.

96
98

In
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isolated in juvenile correctional facilities is significantly higher than those children
who are not isolated.' According to former Attorney General Eric Holder, one
half of juveniles who commit suicide while in custody do so while in solitary
confinement, and 62% of children who committed suicide had been isolated in
solitary confinement at one point.104 The notes to the Prison Rape Elimination Act
state that "[a]mong other things, isolation puts youth at greater risk of committing
suicide .... [a recent] survey determined that 50.6% of the suicides occurred when
inmates were confined to their rooms outside of traditional nonwaking [sic] hours
as a behavioral sanction."10 Placing children in prolonged solitary confinement
directly harms them by increasing the prevalence of mental illness, ultimately
resulting in suicide.
These harmful effects demonstrate that placing juveniles in solitary
confinement is antithetical to the stated goal of the Kentucky Juvenile justice
system, which is to "provide services for the rehabilitation of probated and
committed youth."'o6 As the American Civil Liberties Union notes, "[h]olding
children in solitary confinement can thus result in long-term harm, undermining
their future and the purported goals of the juvenile justice system."107 The National
Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences agrees: "confinement [of
children] under punitive conditions may increase recidivism."0 8 Therefore, instead
of rehabilitating youth, solitary confinement increases rates of suicide, recidivism,
and re-incarceration.
III. JUVENILE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS AND VIOLATES THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDINGS
THAT CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT FROM ADULTS

In the 1970s, courts addressed Eighth Amendment and substantive due process
challenges to juvenile solitary confinement on behalf of children committed and
awaiting disposition.' 9 However, since that wave of litigation passed, fewer parties
have litigated the issue, instead choosing to settle the cases through consent decrees

103

SeeJuvenile Justice Reform Comm., supra note 6.

'0 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Holder Criticizes

Excessive Use of Solitary Confinement for Juveniles with Mental Illness (May 14, 2014),
httpsi//www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-criticizes-excessive-use-solitary-confinementjuveniles-mental.
105 National Standards To Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg. 37106,
37130 (June 20,2012) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115).
106 DJJ 300.1, supra note 27.
'0 Alone &Afiaid, supra note 33, at 5.
0 Id. at 2 (quoting Letter from Robert L. Listenbee, Admin., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Jesselyn
McCurdy, Senior Legislative Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union (July 5, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/doj-ojjdp-response on jj-solitary.pdf).
to ScegenerallyLollisv. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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and judicial oversight. 10 The passage of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, in 1980 may have influenced this area,
as the DOJ began investigating conditions of juvenile confinement throughout the
United States.' Substantive due process and the Eighth Amendment remain the
two constitutional arguments plaintiffs and the DOJ raise on behalf of children.
A. ContemporaryStandards ofDecency PuitiveSobtary Confinement
Amounts to Crueland UnusualPunishment
Courts have applied the Eighth Amendment to juveniles committed to
correction facilities and determined that certain forms of juvenile solitary
confinement violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. 112 In order for a deprivation to rise to a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, it must "result in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.'" 3 The plaintiffs must show that the defendants were "deliberately
indifferen[t] to a substantial risk of serious harm."" The first prong, deliberate
indifference, is a subjective question-were the guards aware of facts that a
substantial risk of harm could be inferred from, and did they draw that inference? 15
The harm must be "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted
'
by prison officials in the past" so that they "must have known about" the risk 16
The second prong, the risk of harm, is an objective question and looks to (1) the
seriousness of the injury, (2) whether there is a sufficient likelihood that serious

no See Consent Decree at 3, U.S. v. Kentucky, No. 95-CV-757 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 1995),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JI-KY-0004-0005.pdf.
n. R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1155-56 (D. Haw. 2006); D. B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F.
Supp. 896, 905 (D. Or. 1982). Kentucky has its own history with CRIPA: in 1995 the Department of
Justice opened CRIPA investigations into five youth development centers across the state. See Consent
Decree at 3, U.S. v. Kentucky, No. 95-CV-757
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 1995),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JI-KY-0004-0005.pdf. The DOJ found that conditions in
the centers utilized isolation excessively and the parties entered into a consent decree whereby Kentucky
agreed to protect the youth from arbitrary and harmful uses of time out and isolation by creating policies
that clarified eligible infractions and oversight. Id.
In 1997, the DOJ conducted a similar investigation into a YDC and two detention centers and
found that the staff placed the youth at risk of suicide because they locked them in their cells for sixteen
to twenty hours per day. BILL LANN LEE, FULL TEXT OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT 1, 4, 14
(1998),
http://www.dearinghouse.net/detailDocumnent.php?id=1471&search=sourcelgeneral;caseType|JI;caseSt
ateIKY;chDocument.caseNum|0001;orderbylchDocument.docDate%20DESC;.The
DOJ noted that,
although the policy manual mandated a hearing with notice and representation, youth were rarely
provided these procedural safeguards. Id.
11 See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1977).
113 Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)).
114 Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)).
115 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
16 Id. at 842.
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injury will result, and (3) whether the risks associated with the activity violate
contemporary standards of decency."'
Advocates against juvenile solitary confinement argue that our maturing society
should refuse to accept isolating children as a general practice because of its
damaging psychological effects-as evidenced by the many states banning its
practice. In one of the most cited cases regarding juvenile solitary confinement,
Louis v. New York State Dept. of Social Services, the court emphasized that the
Eighth Amendment is a changing standard that "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""' In
LoMs, the court held that isolating a child in a room with a bench, no blanket, no
access to light, in night clothes, without recreation or reading material, and without
an end date amounted to cruel and unusual punishment."' The court determined
(1) whether the punishment is disproportionate to the offense and (2) the- severity
or harshness of the sanction as measured by "broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency."120 The opinion cited seven
psychiatrists, psychologists, and educators who were unanimous in concluding that
extended isolation on children is "cruel and inhuman" and "counterproductive to
the development of the child."1 2 ' Although the court declined to issue a statewide
injunction, it required the institution to follow specific restrictions on the use and
conditions of confinement.122 As discussed above, many of today's psychologists,
scientists, politicians, and administrators agree with the findings in Loms- that
isolating juveniles is cruel, inhuman, and counterproductive to the development of
the child. Furthermore, Kentucky's practice of indefinitely isolating these children
mirrors the unconstitutional conditions determined in LoMs.
B. PsychologicallyDamaging, Anti-Rehabiltative, Inhumane:
Punitive Isolation Violates Substantive Due Process
Courts addressing juvenile facilities under substantive due process have found
that conditions of isolation violate juveniles' constitutional rights because these
facilities deny rehabilitation and treatment.13 Regardless of whether or not youth
are being held in detention centers awaiting adjudication or if they have been
committed for committing a crime, this necessary right to treatment is considered a
quid pro quo for society exercising its parenspatriaepowers: "Whether specifically
117 Betts, 621 F.3d at 256-57.
ns Lollis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Serys., 322 F. Supp. 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (quoting Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
119 Id. at 476, 482.
m Id. at 480 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
121 Id
m Id. at 483-84.
m Pena v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 204, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Nelson
v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974).
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recognized by statutory enactment or implicitly derived from the constitutional
requirements of due process, the right to treatment exists."1 24 In Pena v. New York
State Division for Youth, the companion case to Lois, the court held that

conditions at the Goshen Annex violated the boys' Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments because punitive isolation lasting longer than six hours with
inadequate release processes and reporting requirements did not provide for
treatment or rehabilitation.' 2 5 After considering reports from psychologists and
other experts, the district court of Rhode Island held that similar conditions
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the children had a right
to treatment, stating that "solitary confinement may be psychologically damaging,
anti-rehabilitative, and, at times inhumane."'2 6 Kentucky's Policy Manual aims to
"provide services for the rehabilitation of probated and committed youth."1 2 7 The
legislature reaffirmed this goal when it adopted Senate Bill 200, which aims to
reduce recidivism by coordinating treatment systems and increasing rehabilitation
services to youth.1 28 As these courts have stated, locking a child in a room is
psychologically damaging, anti-rehabilitative, and inhumane.
Other courts have rejected the right to treatment approach, instead determining
whether the confinement served the governmental objectives surrounding juvenile
incarceration. Juveniles not yet convicted of a crime have a due process freedom
from unnecessary bodily restraint that is subject to closer scrutiny than those who
have been convicted of a crime through trial.' 29 Any restriction on this freedom
must be reasonably related to a legitimate government interest and not used solely
for punishment. 130 The court in Santana v. Colazo stated the purpose of
incarceration is to protect society from children, instead of providing rehabilitative
treatment.' 3 ' The court declined to hold that isolation consisting of a nine-by-nine
concrete cell with one bed, toilet, and window, and lengths of stay extending to
several months were per se unconstitutional and remanded the case to determine
whether the isolation served a legitimate government interest. 132 The court also
stated that the Eighth Amendment may apply because "[i]t would not be

124

Heyne, 491 F.2d at 359 (quoting Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).

m'Pena,419 F. Supp. at 207, 210 ("[T]his court finds that the detention of a youth under a juvenile

justice system absentprovision for the rehabilitativetreatment ... is a violation of due process rights
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
26
1 Inmates of Boys' Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1372 (D. R.I. 1972).
27 DJJ 300.1, supra note 27.
128 Press Release, Governor Steve Beshear's Comm. Office, Gov. Beshear Ceremonially Signs
Juvenile
Justice
Law
(Aug.
28,
2014),
http://migration.kentucky.gov/Newsroom/governor/20140828juvenile.htm
[hereinafter
Beshear
Ceremonially Signs Juvenile Justice Law].
m Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983); see alsoMilonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d
931, 942 (10th Cir. 1982) ("A person involuntarily confined by the state to an institution retains liberty
interests that are protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.").
' See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (discussing the application of Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) to those with different mental abilities).
131

Collazo, 714 F.2d at 1176-77.

132

Id. at 1177-78, 1181.
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unreasonable to assume that society's conscience might be shocked by the
conditions of confinement imposed on a juvenile in an isolation cell."'33 Kentucky's
punitive isolation policies necessarily impose retribution upon youth and do not
serve any purpose except for punishment. The staff isolate children for indefinite
periods of time for breaking rules, which necessarily violates the children's
substantive due process right to be free from unnecessary bodily restraint unrelated
to any legitimate government objectives.
C. An Indefinite Period Kentucky's Isolation Polcy Violates Procedural
Due Process Under the FourteenthAmendment

-

Kentucky's policy that allows the Director of Medical Services or the Chief of
Mental Health Services to extend isolation beyond five days violates procedural due
process. In H C. v. Jarrd,the court allowed injunctive relief and compensatory'
damages when a child awaiting trial on delinquency charges was subjected to
extended isolation without written notice of the charges against him, without an
opportunity to represent himself before an impartial person, or the ability to call
witnesses on his behalf.134 He was "told that he would remain in isolation until [the
guard] decided to release him."13s Although Kentucky's Policy Manual provides for
notice and a due process hearing with staff representation (not counsel), the
treatment team can impose isolation upon a finding of guilt. 6 Once this hearing is
held, a child could theoretically remain in isolation indefinitely if the Director of
Medical Services or the Chief of Mental Health Services authorizes it. Kentucky
must impose a definite limit on the amount of time a child may remain in isolation
to avoid violating the child's procedural due process rights.
D. Remorse, Renewal, Rehahiltation:Solitary Confinement Contradictsthe
Supreme Court's Holdings that Children Should be TreatedDifferently
In a series of influential decisions, the Supreme Court has recently recognized
that the criminal justice system should treat children differently because they are
still developing and less deserving of the most severe punishments. This rationale
should extend to solitary confinement because, arguably, many of the rationales
behind the recent Supreme Court decisions apply to the arguments against
isolation.
First, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that executing juveniles
violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment because
youth demonstrate "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of

13

'34
135
136

Id. at 1179.
H.C. v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1082-83, 1087-89 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1083.
See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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responsibility[,]" which leads to "impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions."' 7 The Court noted that the character and personality of youth are
"more transitory, less fixed" than those of adults.' These rationales could easily
extend to placing youth in solitary confinement and the effect it has on their brains:
they remain in this state, unable to progress to adulthood."'
Second, the Supreme Court banned juvenile life sentences without parole for
non-homicide offenders because children have the "capacity for change and limited
moral culpability."14 The Court cautioned that the juvenile justice system should
facilitate rehabilitation rather than destroying children's hope: "[l]ife in prison
without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls,
no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope. Maturity can lead to that
considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and
rehabilitation."141 Children, the Court explained, who do not believe they will leave
prison have little incentive to become responsible adults.142 Solitary confinement
also changes a child's perception, removing hope and destroying their chance of
rehabilitation.
Third, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court banned mandatory juvenile life
sentences without parole on the grounds that "juveniles have diminished culpability
and greater prospects for reform."' 43 The Court explained that children's "transient
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences-both lessened a
child's 'moral culpability' and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and
neurological development occurs, [the child's] 'deficiencies will be reformed.'"' In
Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court extended the rationale of these
three cases to hold that retroactivity applies to juveniles sentenced to life without
parole because children deserve different penological treatment based on their
diminished culpability and capacity for reform. 145
While the Supreme Court has not recently confronted solitary confinement
directly, Justice Kennedy delivered a clear warning in his concurrence to Davis v.
Ayala: "Too easily ignored is the question of what comes next. Prisoners are shut
away--out of sight, out of mind."" Justice Kennedy continued to argue that "the
judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to determine
whether workable alternative systems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so,
whether a correctional system should be required to adopt them."147 Some argue
" Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-69 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 349, 367
(1993)).
" Id. at 570.
139 See supra Part II (discussing self-control and decision making).
44
' Graham v. lorida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
141 Id. at 79.
142

143
144

'"

147

I
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2464 (2012).
Id. at 2465 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68-69).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, slip op. at 14-17 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016).
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2210.
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that Justice Kennedy set the stage for the Supreme Court to return to the issue in
the future. 14 Punitive juvenile solitary confinement contradicts each of these
holdings because it destroys any potential of rehabilitation by removing children's
hope and incentive to become responsible adults.
E. Following the Examples of Others: States SurroundingKentucky Have
Restricted orBanned Punitive Soliary Confinement
States surrounding Kentucky have banned solitary confinement through
litigated consent decrees, regulations, or statutes. West Virginia statutorily banned
juvenile solitary confinement in 1998, but continued the practice until 2012 when
the Director of Juvenile Services ordered an end to it in response to a lawsuit.149
Investigations by the DOJ's Civil Rights Division pursuant to CRIPA into juvenile
facilities' use of solitary confinement consistently uncovered unconstitutional
conditions. Mississippi, `s Montana, "s New York, 152 and Arizona"'s recently
usSee David G. Savage, Justice Kennedy PracticallyInvites a Challenge to Soitary Confinement,
L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2015 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/a-na-justice-kennedy-solitary20150618-story.html.
149 NATASHA A. FROST & CARLOS E. MONTEIRO, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE:
(2016),
IN
U.S.
PRISONS
8
SEGREGATION
ADMINISTRATIVE

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiLesl/nij/249749.pdf ("West Virginia became the first state to ban the solitary
confinement of youth in custody in 1998."); Associated Press, W Va. Ends Soliary Confnement for
Juveniles, TIMES WEST VIRGINIAN (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.timeswv.com/news/w-va-ends("West
solitary-confinement-for-juveniles/article_79dclc7e-3279-5e97-adef-fc45c9c2deaa.html
Virginia has stopped using solitary confinement to punish juvenile offenders in response to a lawsuit by
two inmates at the Industrial Home for Youth in Salem.").
1so Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Children Will No Longer Be Housed in Facility Run
by Private Prison Company After ACLU and Southern Poverty Law Center Lawsuit (Feb. 27, 2012),
https://www.aclu.org/news/groundbreaking-federal-consent-decree-will-prohibit-solitary-confinementyouth-mississippi.
"s Settlement Agreement at 2-3, Katka v. Montana, No. BDV 2009-1163 (D. Mont. Mar. 30,
2012), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JI-MT-0004-0002.pdf ("[Youth] shall not be
placed in isolated confinement ... for longer than 72 hours without the approval of the Director of the
Department of Corrections ... and without certification from the mental health team ... that the
extended isolation would not have an adverse affect upon the inmate's mental health.").
152 Settlement Agreement at 21, Peoples v. Fischer, No. 1:11-CV-02694 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2015), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-NY-0062-0011.pdf ("[The state] will ensure
that even under the most restrictive form of disciplinary housing, 16 and 17 year-old inmates shall, 5
days per week ... be offered out-of-cell programming and outdoor exercise, limiting time in their cells
to 19 hours a day. . . .").
1s3 Arizona entered into consent decrees in 1993 and 2004 in response to allegations of excessive use
of solitary confinement and isolation. Consent Decree, Johnson v. Upchurch, No. CIV 86-195 TUC
RMB (D. Ariz. May 5, 1993), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/Jl-AZ-0002-0002.pdf;
Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department ofJustice and the State of Arizona
Concerning Adobe Mountain School, Black Canyon School, and Catalina Mountain School, U.S. v.
Arizona, No 2:04-cv-01926 (D. Ariz. Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JIAZ-0003-0003.pdf. The 1993 consent decree expired in 1997 and the 2004 consent decree expired in
2007. See
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entered into agreements that dramatically reduced the use of solitary confinement
in juvenile facilities.
The Southern District of Ohio recently terminated the consent decree reached
in S.H. v. Reed and United States v. Ohio between the Ohio Department of Youth
Services ("ODYS"), a class of incarcerated juveniles, and the United States after
ODYS agreed to severely limit the use of solitary confinement. 5 Initially,
investigators found "that the conditions of confinement for youth in DYS
[Department of Youth Services] facilities violated the constitutional and statutory
rights of those youth"'and the "[e]xcessive force and the excessive use of isolation,
some of it extraordinarily prolonged, is endemic to the ODYS [Ohio Department
of Youth Services] system.""s
Illinois underwent similar changes to its use of solitary confinement due to a
similar class action, R.j v. Jones."' In that case, it was alleged that conditions
violated the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting
the youth to "room confinement when not warranted, for excessive periods of time,
and in improper conditions." 158 The complaint claimed that the Illinois
Department of Juvenile Justice ("IDJJ") acted with deliberate indifference to the
deficient conditions, and as a direct result the plaintiffs suffered irreparable harm."s'
The district judge approved a consent decree in 2012 and a remedial plan in 2014
that allowed separation, but required the children to be out of their cells for eight
hours per day.' Unfortunately, the monitors expressed concern that the staff failed
to follow the plan. In the first half of 2015, 1,697 incidents involved confinement
or time out in rooms with graffiti and inadequate lighting and ventilation.' 6
A child awaiting disposition in Tennessee recently filed a complaint in Doe v.
Hommich, which alleged that solitary confinement objectively and subjectively
constituted inhumane treatment and that the defendant acted with deliberate
indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSONS
ACT
CONSENT
DECREE
21-22
(November
2013),

https*//www.njrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/244085.pdf. Currently, Arizona does not allow punitive
solitary confinement, but only allows separation if the youth is a danger to themselves, others, or if they
self-refer. Kraner et al., supra note 28, at 10. A hearing is required after twenty-four hours of
confinement. Id.
15
See generally Order, S.H. v. Reed, No. 2:08-CV-00475 (S.D. Ohio 2015),
https://scholar.google.com/scholar-case?case=3198521333530402483&hl=en8cas-sdt=6&asvis=1&oi=
scholarr.
1ss Order, supra note 154 at 2.
us FRED COHEN, FINAL FACT-FINDING REPORT, S.H v STICKRATH ii (Jan. 2008),
http://www.dys.ohio.gov/DNN/LinkClick.aspx?fleticket=lDovnn7P96A%3D.
1s7 RJ v.fJones, supra note 10.
s Class Action Complaint at 1-2, R.J. v. Bishop, No. 1:12-cv-07289 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.adu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RJ.-v.-Bishop-Complaint-of-9-12-12.pdf.
I1s
Id. at 11.
'" R.J v. Jones, supra note 10.
16

1 BARRY KRISBERG, PROGRESS OF THE SAFETY AND WELFARE REMEDIAL PLAN: R.J. ET AL.,
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"[t]here can be no doubt that solitary confinement of juveniles is objectively
harmful, as authorities from state, federal, international and scientific communities
agree that such confinement is extremely damaging to youth." 162 As of the
publication of this Note, the case is still pending. It is the author's hope that
Tennessee will ban the practice. Kentucky, too, should join its neighbors who have
recognized the objectively harmful effects of solitary confinement and ban the
practice.
IV. INTO CLASSROOMS AND OUT OF COURTROOMS: MAINTAINING PUNITIVE
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE GOALS OF THE
RECENTJUVENILE JUSTICE REFORMS OF SENATE BILL 200

Senate Bill 200 (the "Bill"), which "substantially overhaul[s] Kentucky's juvefiile
justice system,"mseeks to keep children within their homes and out of state care by
"steering more young offenders into community-based treatment instead of locking
them up in detention centers."'6 4 Senate Bill 200 was the result of the work of the
Unified Juvenile Code Task Force, and most reforms contained in the Bill were to
take effect in the summer of 2015.16s Senate Bill 200 represents a shift in the way
legislatures in Kentucky view children and the role of state detention in their lives.
Many within the juvenile justice community recognize the harmful effects of
incarceration on children and tout Senate Bill 200 as a solution to this problem.
The rationale behind Senate Bill 200 can be summed up in this comment by
Kentucky's Director of the Department for Behavioral Health Developmental and
Intellectual Disabilities: "It has been well established that detention and
incarceration do not provide for positive outcomes for youth. This legislation will
facilitate early identification of children and youth in need of behavioral health
services and keep them in our classrooms, not our courtrooms."'16 However, the
Bill did not ban juvenile solitary confinement, despite its focus on rehabilitation
and protecting children from remaining in state disciplinary care. Regulations
explicitly promoting solitary confinement in juvenile facilities were updated on
January 4, 2016, six months after the enactment of Senate Bill 200.167
Juvenile solitary confinement directly contradicts any hope for these positive
youth outcomes. As discussed, solitary confinement can permanently alter the way
a child thinks and can cause the child to remain in an immature and impulsive state.
162 First Amended Complaint - Class Action Complaint at 4, 13, 18-19, Doe v. Hommrich No. 32015),
http://www.aclu-tn.org/wp18,
May
Tenn.
(M.D.
16-cv-00799
content/uploads/2016/06/Juvenile-Solitary-Amended-Complaint-REDACTED.pdf.
163 Christina Weeter, Senate Bill 20, KY. DEPT OF EDUC. (June 23, 2015 11:25 AM),
http://education.ky.gov/school/sdfs/Pages/Senate-Bill-200.aspx.
'4 Beshear Ceremonially Signs Juvenile Justice Law, supra note 128.
165 Weeter, supra note 163.
1
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The goals of Senate Bill 200 mirror the concerns of the federal government,
numerous agencies supporting youth and mental health, and the Supreme Court:
detention and incarceration, and especially isolation, do not provide positive
outcomes for children. Rather, juvenile solitary confinement prevents children from
reforming or rehabilitating.
Senate Bill 200 is also motivated by a desire to decrease the state's juvenile
facilities budget. 68 Before the enactment of Senate Bill 200, more than half of the
state's $102 million budget for the Department of Juvenile Justice was spent on
secure and non-secure facilities.' 9 It is reported that this juvenile justice reform bill
will reduce the amount spent on incarcerating juveniles by $24 million over the
next five years. 7 o This money will be reinvested into programs to help prevent
juvenile incarceration. 17 ' However, Kentucky's isolation practices contradict these
goals by causing the child to remain in an immature state with poor impulse control,
which increases rates of recidivism and will drive up the costs of incarceration. If
Kentucky truly wants to reform the juvenile justice system to keep children out of
the courtroom and decrease the costs of incarceration, it should follow the example
of many other states and abolish punitive juvenile solitary confinement.
V. DIGGING OUT OF THE HOLE: ALTERNATE APPROACHES AND CONCLUSION

This Note argues for the eradication of punitive juvenile solitary confinement in
Kentucky. Many states have placed limitations on the amount of time children may
be placed in solitary confinement or clarified the offenses necessary to isolate a
child. 172 Kentucky should align itself and abolish punitive juvenile solitary
confinement because children are fundamentally different from adults, the practice
violates due process, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the
practice is contrary to Kentucky's recent efforts to reform juvenile justice.
Confining juveniles permanently changes their ability to make rational decisions,
leading to increased rates of recidivism, destroying their ability to mature, and
defeating the goals of rehabilitation. Many children do not survive solitary
confinement, as the isolation leads to increased rates of suicide, and those who do
survive are more likely to commit suicide upon release.
If Kentucky elects to continue this damaging practice, it should place a cap on
the amount of time children may be placed in punitive solitary confinement.
Although the regulations mandate a maximum of five days per offense, this time

16s Kentucky's 2014Juvende JusdceRefonn, supra note 13, at 7.

169
170 Id. at 1.
J

171 S
1"

See Kraner eet al., supra note
28.
n

2016-2017

Digging Out of the Hole: Arguments Against the Use of
Juvenile Solitary Confinement in Kentucky

175

may be extended by the director of medical services or the chief of mental health
services. Additionally, no regulations prevent the child from gaining new offenses
while in solitary confinement, extending their time in isolation indefinitely.
Eliminating administrators' ability to indefinitely postpone release from solitary
confinement and placing a five-day maximum, regardless of the number of offenses,
would lessen the risk of long lasting psychological harm and increasing recidivism.
Additionally, Kentucky should limit the number of infractions that would place
a child in solitary confinement and clarify the eligible offenses. Ambiguous terms,
such as "serious disruption to the program," or "dangerous contraband" leave room
for discretion and do not provide sufficient guidance for children attempting to
avoid solitary confinement. The legislature should clarify these terms, reducing
administrator's discretion and increasing stability to the facility. Finally, Kentucky
should require facilities to report the number of isolations and the duration of
isolation in a certain period. This would allow advocates to track the use of
isolation in DOJ facilities and monitor how long children remain isolated.
Kentucky's practice of allowing indefinite solitary confinement not only
endangers the children it has a duty to protect, it contradicts United States
Supreme Court precedent, federal legislative action, direct admonitions from the
President, and the policies behind Kentucky's own Senate Bill 200. While
dissenters may argue that facilities require isolation to impose order on otherwise
dangerous and unruly children, it is dear from scientific research that isolating
them for indefinite periods of time does far more than impose order: it
fundamentally alters their brain chemistry and makes them less likely to practice

self-control and more likely to reoffend. In order to comply with the goals of
Kentucky's Senate Bill 200, which seeks to reduce the rate of juvenile placement
outside of the home and save money, the state should end punitive solitary
confinement.

